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A b s t r a c t   
 
Purpose: Investigation reports into the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig disaster identified 
issues with the drill crew's situation awareness (SA). The aim was to (1) apply the Driller's 
Situation Awareness (DSA) model to the cognitive data extracted from accident reports from 
this event to determine if it could help to explain why the crew erroneously concluded that 
the well was stable, which would (2) provide a preliminary evaluation of the model's validity. 
Method: The DSA model was used for a content analysis of the SA components in the 
accounts of the crew's actions during two Negative Pressure Tests (NPT), in the hours before 
the blowout. 
Results: The analysis provided (1) insight into the crew's likely cognitive processes before 
the blowout. In particular, it revealed issues with their interpretation and mental models of 
the well state, as well as possible influencing factors including expectation, distraction and 
experience, emphasising the impact that SA can have on process safety. The categorisation 
has (2) initially suggested that the DSA model does contain the appropriate components. 
Limitations: There are limited first hand reports of this event and thus cognitive processes 
have to be inferred with a degree of caution. 
Practical implications: The findings give a preliminary validation of the DSA model for further 
use in training and in investigation of well control events. Recommendations based on the 
findings are offered for assisting driller SA and consequently, for supporting safe and efficient 
drilling operations. There is also the opportunity to adapt the DSA model and apply the 
recommendations from the analysis to similar monitoring positions, where SA is essential, 
within the process industries. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Human failures in relation to monitoring and situation awareness of plant status have been identified across the 
process industries (e.g. chemical plants, Shin, 2014; gas platforms and gas processing plants, Antonovsky et al., 2014). 
For example, operators appeared to have failed to monitor the level of chemicals in a bulk storage tank and to 
recognise that it was overfilling, which resulted in a vapour cloud that ignited at the Buncefield fuel depot, causing a 
huge explosion (Atkinson et al., 2014). Failures to monitor crucial indicators were also identified in the Texas City 
disaster, such as the increased pressure in the raffinate splitter and safety relief systems (Khan and Amyotte, 2007). 
In the offshore drilling industry, the same cognitive skills are required for the drill crew that are building the wells for 
oil and gas extraction. This paper examines the role of the drill crew's situation awareness in the Deepwater 
Horizon drilling rig disaster. 
On April 20th 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was preparing to temporarily abandon the Macondo well, in the 
Gulf of Mexico, when it experienced a significant blowout of hydrocarbons. This resulted in the death of 11 crew 
members, the rig's destruction and the worst oil spill in US history. The accident cost the operating company, BP, an 
estimated $43bn, excluding potential fines for gross negligence (Macalister, 2014). The human and environmental costs 
of Deepwater Horizon make it critical to understand what happened in order to advise how best to ensure a similar 
disaster does not happen in the future. We applied our Driller's Situation Awareness (DSA) model (Roberts et al., 2015) 
on cognitive data extracted from a specific period in the accident reports, to test this model and to investigate why the 
crew erroneously concluded that the well was stable. As operators do not intend to have inaccurate SA or to take the 
wrong decision, considering why an action seemed like the right thing to do, rather than focusing on what operators did 
wrong, can be valuable for avoiding some of the pitfalls of hindsight bias (Dekker, 2007, 2009). 
A brief account of the relevant phase (Negative Pressure Test) of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and why it was 
selected for detailed analysis follows, then we introduce the concept of situation awareness and explain how it has 
been previously studied in the drilling industry. 
 
1.1. Investigation into Deepwater Horizon 
 
In the wake of the disaster, numerous investigation reports examined the events leading up to the blowout and the 
subsequent response (see Table 1). These highlighted issues associated with technical decision making, management 
failures within BP, the overarching regulatory framework, and human factors. This paper focuses on the last of these 
issues. 
As in all high risk domains, the system operators play a key role in protecting or endangering technical and human 
assets on the operational site. In drilling tasks, accurate monitoring of the well's state and recognition of “kick” 
indicators (when well control is lost, an influx of fluids into the well can occur, referred to as a “kick”) are vital for 
effective responses to reduce the risk of adverse consequences such as a blowout (API, 2006; Fraser et al., 2014). Well 
control and kick detection act as essential process safety barriers. The drill crew's role in the Deepwater Horizon 
accident is indicated in the Report to the President (2011), which states that “the failure to properly conduct and 
interpret the negative pressure test (NPT) was a major contributing factor to the blowout” (p.119). The crew 
erroneously believed the well was stable when it was not, missing and/or misinterpreting crucial cues and hence not 
being fully aware of what was going wrong down the well. Therefore, the crew did not have an accurate situation 
awareness of the well state. Consequently, the NPT phase of the event was selected for detailed analysis. 
This test (NPT) is a means of checking the integrity of a well's “bottom hole” cement job, designed to prevent 
hydrocarbons leaking into the wellbore when the well is temporarily abandoned. The NPT could be considered as a 
type of situation awareness tool with which to gather information on the well and assess its stability. It requires a 
relatively interactive role from the drill crew compared to the monitoring components of everyday drilling tasks in the 
drill cabin. The methods used to minimise the potential for a kick (see below) or blowout, as occurred on Deepwater 
Horizon (and to regain control of the well in such an event) are known as well control (IADC, 2015). These include the 
hydrostatic pressure produced from the column of drilling fluid, equipment (e.g. the Blow-Out Preventer) and 
procedures (e.g. flow monitoring). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.2. Situation awareness 
 
Situation Awareness (SA) is the cognitive skill of maintaining awareness of the work environment, to understand the 
information that it holds, and to predict how situations will develop (Endsley, 1995, 2015). Inaccurate SA can lead to 
poor decision making and unnecessary risk taking, increasing the likelihood of an accident (Stanton et al., 2001). A 
number of SA theories have been proposed (e.g., Smith and Hancock, 1995; Wickens, 2002; Stanton  et  al., 2009). 
However, Endsley's (1995) three level model of SA dominates the field, being frequently applied in higher risk domains 
(e.g. nuclear power plants, Lee et al., 2012; maritime, Saus et al., 2012). She describes SA as a cognitive product of 
three hierarchical levels, perception (Level 1), comprehension (Level 2) and prediction (Level 3), identifying task and 
environmental factors, as well as individual factors that can influence it. 
 
1.3. Situation awareness in drilling incidents 
 
The role of SA has been identified in drilling incidents, including the blowout on the West Atlas rig on the Montara 
well, which caused a substantial oil spill in the Timian Sea (Montara Report, 2010) and the sinking of the Petrobras  
P-36 drilling rig which killed 11 men (Woodcock and Toy, 2011; USEPA, 2001). Poor monitoring and 
misinterpretation of crucial kick indicators were also involved in the Bardolino incident in the North Sea which 
occurred only four months prior to Deepwater Horizon (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2010). Situation 
awareness has also been associated with numerous small scale accidents and personal injuries (Lootz et al., 2013; 
Hare and Johnson, 2009). Furthermore, offshore installation managers reported that loss of care and attention 
was one of the main causes of accidents on their production platforms and drilling rigs (O'Dea and Flin, 1998). 
Cognitive factors have also been identified in relation to Deepwater Horizon. Reader and O'Connor (2014) applied 
a non-technical skills framework, including SA, to examine the blowout. They highlighted several cognitive factors 
(e.g. confirmation bias and expectation). Similarly, Hopkins (2012) noted the crew's inaccurate mental model of the 
situation which was fed by their assumptions. While useful in emphasising the importance of SA in Deepwater 
Horizon, these studies did not analyse the situation awareness of the drill crew explicitly or in depth. 
 
1.4.  Research on situation awareness in drilling 
 
Issues in relation to drillers' concentration, inadequate hand-offs, poorly designed displays, difficulties with 
interpretation of information, inaccuracies in analysis and omitting to monitor data have been identified in research 
studies (Stanton and Wilson, 2001; Det Norske Veritas, 2007; Sawaryn et al., 2008). Sneddon et al., (2006) utilized 
accident analysis and interviews, and found that 67% of SA errors in drilling were classified as level 1 errors, as per 
Endsley's (1995) model of SA, with the majority of these relating to failure to monitor or observe data. A 
questionnaire study of drilling personnel in the North Sea found that higher levels of stress, sleep disruption and 
fatigue are significantly associated with lower levels of SA, and lower SA was related to more unsafe behaviour and 
increased work accidents (Sneddon et al., 2013). Thus these results highlighted the impact that SA errors can have 
on safety. 
 
Table 1 
Sources used to develop the timeline and analyses. 
Sources 
Bly Report, BP. (2010). Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report. 
Chief Counsel's Report. (2011). Macondo; The gulf oil disaster. 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group (2011). Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout. 
National Academy of Engineering (2011). Macondo Well e Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Offshore Drilling Safety. 
OLF (2012). Deepwater Horizon lessons learned and follow-up. 
Report to the President (2011). National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 
The Joint United States Coast Guard/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Investigation (2010). USCG/MMS Marine Board investigation into the marine casualty, 
explosion, fire, pollution and sinking of the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon, with loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico 21e22 April 2010. 
Transocean Investigation Report (2011). Macondo well incident. Volume 1 & 2. 
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2014). Explosion and fire at the Macondo well. Investigation Report Volume 1 & 2. Report No. 2010-10-I-OS. 
United States of America V. BP Exploration & Production Inc. et al. 2:10-CV-4536 (2013). Transcripts of nonjury trial proceedings heard before the honourable Carl J. Barbier 
United States District Judge. (R. Ezell, p1653ep.1813; J. Keith, p.3488e3726). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We used an analysis of well control simulator observations and interviews with drill crew members to develop the 
prototype Driller's Situation Awareness (DSA) framework (Roberts et al., 2015) (see Fig. 1), which is based upon 
Endsley's (1995) three level model. As SA research in drilling has been limited, this empirically based model provided 
preliminary understanding of the cognitive components associated with offshore drillers' development and 
maintenance of SA during well control and identifies key influencing factors. 
The DSA model portrays a cyclic process of information gathering and cue recognition, from the task environment 
and other crew members, to form an understanding of the well state and anticipate how it may develop. Specific SA 
skills such as focussing on the drilling screens or activity on the drill floor, obtaining information from multiple sources 
(e.g. phone calls, asking questions, calculations and handovers) and recognizing a pattern from available indicators 
were found to be important for the driller to successfully build a mental model of the well state. As in other domains, 
comprehension is founded on mental models, expectations and experience, as well as sharing of information between 
crew members. Anticipation is achieved through mental visualizations of how the situation may develop and this can 
be based on actions e.g. mentally preparing a game plan or making required calculations. Influencing factors consisted 
of distraction, experience, expectation, coping with stressful or demanding situations, work environment and 
workload. 
 
2. Objectives 
 
The objective of this study was to (1) apply the prototype DSA model (Fig. 1) to the accounts of the drill crew's situation 
awareness during the Deepwater Horizon NPT event to determine if this could explain why the crew erroneously 
concluded that the well was stable, which would (2) act as a preliminary evaluation of the model's validity. 
 
 
3. Method 
 
The investigation reports and court transcripts that focussed on the drill crew's actions, were the basis for the analysis 
(see Table 1). A content analysis of the NPT phase of these reports was undertaken, following Miles et al., (2014) 
guidance on testing the validity of qualitative models. As this was a preliminary evaluation, the only criterion was that 
the cognitive components of the DSA model should be present in the data. This accident analysis should also identify 
any additional aspects of drillers' SA not represented, and components which do not merit inclusion, in the model. 
Miles et al. recommended that expert feedback should be obtained to 
verify this data analysis. 
As for any major event, each document in Table 1 has a particular focus and each may have inherent biases 
associated with the chosen focus. Where contradictions occurred, the Chief Counsel's Report (2011) was given 
precedence, as it provided the most detail and did not take a specific legal stance. All the sources were taken at face 
value. Due to the nature of the event and the absence of evidence from key workers who were killed in the accident, 
the mental processes outlined are inferred from the survivors' accounts. However, first hand evidence is included 
where available (e.g. R. Ezell's trial proceeding transcript).  
First, as advised for systematic accident analysis (Salmon et al., 2011), a timeline featuring the key personnel (see 
Table 2) was produced for the final shift of the drill crew before the blowout occurred on 20th April, 11am to 
9.52pm. 
Secondly, the DSA framework was applied to the accounts of the NPT time frame of 3pm~8pm which encompassed 
preparation for the tests, their execution and the eventual decision that the NPT was successful. This involved reading 
each report for every step of the event to identify the SA components and influencing factors, then coding the text 
using the DSA framework. This produced an adapted form of a SA requirements table (Endsley, 1993). It was verified by 
a drilling expert who was familiar with the event. 
For the first NPT (5pme~6.45pm), two of the main reports, the Chief Counsel's Report and Report to the President, 
were cross-coded for this time frame, using coding rules for content analysis (Mayring, 2004). A second coder was 
trained in using the coding scheme and a basic understanding of the drill crew roles by the first coder (the first author). 
Whilst there was a possibility of transferring the first coder's biases and expectations during the training period, the 
coding of non-fitting data was strongly emphasized. Both coders practised using the coding scheme together on a 
section of the event not included in the analysis (3pm~4pm), after which they separately coded the reports for the first 
NPT. Cohen's (1960) kappa coefficient was found to be acceptable (0.738) (Fleiss, 1981). The remaining hours of the 
event were coded by the first author. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. Roberts et al.'s (2015) Driller's Situation Awareness (DSA) model. 
 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Analysis of the drill crew's SA during the negative pressure tests 
 
A narrative of the drill crew's likely cognitive processes relating to the DSA framework during the NPTs was extracted 
from the material (see Table 3). A more detailed description of the development of the crew's situation awareness 
throughout the event and the influencing factors (shown in parenthesis), including experience, expectations, stored 
mental models, stress, distracters, work environment and workload is provided below. The relevant components of the 
DSA model are noted in bold for each stage. (See Appendix A for abbreviations and glossary.) 
 
4.1.1. Preparation for NPT 
 
The drill crew prepared for the first NPT by conducting a pre-job safety meeting and preparing the well for the NPT by 
pumping a specialised fluid (called a spacer), to above the BOP annular. 
The positive pressure test for the cement job of the casing conducted earlier in the shift (approximately 11am), 
had been deemed a success, thus providing a strong expectation that the forthcoming negative pressure test 
would also be successful (expectations). It is unclear whether the drill crew were aware of the BP well site leaders' 
concerns about prior losses recorded during the cement job (Report to the President, 2011, p.118; Transocean 
Investigation Report, 2011, p.94; level 1 SA). The spacer was an unusually large volume (424bbls) and made from 
left over, heavy Lost Circulation Materials (LCM), making it less likely that the crew had any substantial experience of 
circulating such a large volume and density of spacer into position (experience). Furthermore, whilst the crew may 
have been aware of the difficulties with the centralisers and multiple attempts at converting the float-collar 
during the cement job on the previous day, it is unclear whether they incorporated this information into their 
understanding of the situation (mental model) or anticipated the impact that this may have had on the NPT 
(anticipation). Rather it appears that they viewed the previous problems in isolation from the NPT and the crew 
failed to anticipate their impact (R. Ezell Trial Proceeding Testimony, p.1668; level 1 SA). 
It   has  been   suggested  that   during  the   3pm   pre-job  safety meeting, led by the mud engineer, whilst a general 
overview of the displacement procedure and negative pressure test was given (sharing information &  
 
 
 
 
 
 expectations; Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p.149), there was no mention of any contingency procedure should the 
test fail, thus priming the crew that the test would pass (expectation; Chief Counsel's Report, p. 120, p.163; e.g. 
Doyen et al., 2012). Consequently, the drill crew may not have included these concerns in their on-task mental 
model (level 2 SA), not recognised the significance of conducting the negative pressure test (level 2 SA) or 
considering the lack of specific details, had not fully understood the NPT procedure (work environment impact on 
level 2 SA), potentially impacting on their SA throughout the task to come. It should also be noted that some 
members in the crew were close to the end of their stay offshore, making them more likely to be affected by 
fatigue (Burke et al., 2003). In addition, there was commercial pressure to complete the temporary abandonment 
procedure, which was already six weeks behind schedule, racking up considerable costs for BP (Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group, 2011). For example, the setbacks on the Macondo well were putting BP's more lucrative Kaskida 
well's licence in jeopardy by delaying it (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p. 354). A number of crew were also waiting to 
move onto their next jobs; for example, the Transocean tool pusher Jason Anderson had already been assigned to his 
next job on which he had been promoted to senior tool pusher (R. Ezell trial proceeding transcript, p.1737). This may 
have led the crew to experience time pressure which may have impacted on their SA and decision making (Sarter and 
Schroeder, 2001; Wickens, 2002). 
 
Table 2 
Key figures involved in the final shift and NPT including role, name and company. 
 
Role Name Company 
Assistant driller (AD) Donald Clark Transocean 
Assistant driller (AD) Stephen Curtis Transocean 
Cementer Chris Haire Halliburton 
Driller Dewey Revette Transocean 
Mud engineer Gordon Jones M-I Swaco 
Mud engineer Leo Linder M-I Swaco 
Mud engineer Greg Meche M-I Swaco 
Mud logger Cathleena Willis Sperry Drilling 
Mud logger Joseph Keith Sperry Drilling 
Offshore installation manager Jimmy Harrell Transocean 
Onshore senior drilling engineer Mark Hafle BP 
Senior tool pusher (senior supervisor) Randy Ezell Transocean 
Tool pusher (supervisor) Jason Anderson Transocean 
Tool pusher (supervisor) Wyman Wheeler Transocean 
Trainee well site leader (company representative on the rig) Lee Lambert BP 
Well site leader (company representative on the rig) Bob Kaluza BP 
Well site leader (company representative on the rig) Don Vidrine BP 
 
 
Table 3 
The timeline and associated situation awareness stages and influencing factors. Note: a row represents a key aspect of the event so may include more than one SA cycle. 
Event  e negative pressure test Information available (Level Crew interpretation/ Any predictions made? (Level 3 Influencing factors (PSFs) 
 
~3pm e Pre-job safety meeting 
1 SA) 
General displacement 
understanding (Level 2 SA) 
Unclear how fully the crew 
SA) 
Overall anticipation of the coming Expectations about the coming 
led by the mud engineer with 
the well site leader present. 
procedure and NPT 
information but no 
contingency procedure 
should the test fail. (CCR, 
p.163). 
understood the procedure for 
conducting NPT. 
Crew's mental model was likely 
missing information about 
concerns during the cement job 
and risks associated with NPT. 
The well site leader “wasn't really 
clear on the neg[ative] test 
procedure.” (CCR, p.163, 120). 
displacement procedure but did 
not appear to include predicted 
bleed off volumes or how to 
interpret the readings. 
shift with a strong emphasis that 
the NPT would pass. 
Lack of clarity on the procedures 
could have made understanding 
the coming task difficult (work 
environment). 
Crew nearly at the end of three 
week stay offshore (fatigue). 
Pressure to complete the job 
(workload). 
3.04pme3.56pm e The driller 1200psi on the kill line with Update mental model that the The driller anticipated that the Stored mental models of the well, 
pumped seawater into the the pump strokes and boost, choke and kill lines now boost would be used for boosting equipment and mud system 
boost, choke and kill lines to 
displace mud. 
 
~3.56e4.53pm e Pumped spacer 
volumes for pumping into 
boost, choke and kill lines. 
 
Pressure readings, pump 
contain seawater, not mud and 
that there is still 1200psi on the 
kill line. 
 
Updating mental model during 
the pumping of the mud during 
the displacement procedure 
making preparations to filli it with 
seawater . 
Should the importance of the 
would have been utilized for 
updating the mental model. 
 
Unlikely that the crew had any 
followed by fresh water and strokes and volumes for displacement process of locations spacer characteristics not be substantial experience with 
seawater to displace ~3,300 ft pumping of different fluids in drill pipe, understood, it is less likely that it dealing with such a large or heavy 
of mud so that the spacer was 424bbls of 16.0ppg spacer well bore and riser. would be anticipated that any of spacer. (CCR, p.150) 
above the BOP for conducting followed by 30bbls of fresh Final mental model showing the the spacer would have fallen back Unloading of mud onto the 
the NPT. 
Note: CCR ¼ Chief Counsel's 
Report (2011) 
water and 352bbls of 
seawater at 8.6ppg to 
displace 14.17ppg mud. 
Unclear if crew were made 
spacer as 12 ft above the BOP with through the BOP. Or that this 
mud above it and seawater below  action would influence the  
it to 8.367 ft with the remainder of subsequent NPT. 
the well bore containing mud to 
Bankston ship between 3.03pm 
and 5.10pm will have made it 
difficult to monitor returning mud 
volumes (work environment). 
aware of the characteristics bottom hole. 
of the spacer. Unclear if they recognised that the 
unusually large, heavy LCM spacer 
took considerable time to pump 
down. 
4pme6pm e Simultaneous Drill crew were made aware Updating the mental model that On-shift mud logger had concerns 
operations occurring including that these other operations these operations were going on that these operations would affect 
the cleaning of the trip tank 
preparing for the cement plug 
and bleeding off the riser 
tensioners. 
could affect volume and 
flow metre readings. 
during this time frame. her ability to monitor the return 
mud flow (work environment). 
Preparation for the cement plug 
would give the expectation that 
the negative pressure test was 
going to pass. 
4.53pm e The driller closed the Drill pipe pressure 2,325psi Interpretation of closed drill pipe No calculation of the anticipated 
annular but it was ~700psi 
higher than expected. 
when annular closed. pressure would have been skewed closed drill pipe pressure. 
without an expected calculated 
reading to compare it to, perhaps 
resulting in the significance being 
missed. 
The driller bled off the pressure on When the KL was opened, The current mental model with Likely failed to anticipate the Stored mental models about the U- 
drill pipe to equalise with kill pressure decreased to knowledge about the U-tube consequences of these readings tube effect appear not to have 
line (KL) at 1,250psi. On 645psi but the DPP effect should have shown that the on the well or NPT and no been included. 
opening them, the Kill Line increased to 1,350psi (crew/ DPP and KLP should match if remedial actions were taken, such The complexity of the mental 
Pressure (KLP) decreased and well site leaders' discussion going into same fluid. Well site as circulating up to ensure no model may have influenced the 
the Drill Pipe Pressure (DPP) 
increased simultaneously. 
of the readings). leaders appear to have recognised spacer was left below the BOP. 
this, showing concerns about the 
readings. 
The crew appear to have stuck to 
the interpretation that the spacer 
was still above the BOP and that 
the well was correctly set up for 
the NPT, failing to accurately 
interpret the readings. 
accuracy of the current mental 
model. 
Appear to have stuck to their 
expectation that the spacer was 
above the BOP, influencing the 
interpretation of the readings. 
5pm e Start NPT by shutting When the DP was opened Unable to bleed the pressure No calculations were prepared for The riser leak may have distracted 
annular preventer in BOP and the pressure was 260psi and down to 0psi with some bleed off. the amount of acceptable bleed off the crew during their 
opening DP to bleed off 
pressure with flow during 
closed 1,262psi with 
pressure building up over 
The pressure then continued to 
build up on the drill pipe once it 
making subsequent interpretation interpretation process. 
inaccurate. 
bleed off. When closed pressure 6 min. had been closed in. 
builds up over 6 min. Witnesses have suggested 
that there was ~23bbls of 
flow during the bleed off 
(CCR, p.153). 
Failed to interpret the readings as 
an unsuccessful NPT or the 
significance of the short amount 
of time taken for the pressure to 
build back up. 
5.10pm e The crew notice that Riser volume is falling. The riser appears to have been Unclear whether they anticipated Problem of riser leak may have 
the level of fluid in the riser was 
falling, looking down the rotary 
leaking and crew were trying to 
gauge how much had leaked. 
the effect of the spacer leaking 
below the annular on any 
distracted attention away from the 
previous negative pressure test. 
(continued on next page) 
 
 
Table 3 (continued ) 
Event  e negative pressure test Information available (Level Crew interpretation/ 
 
 
Any predictions made? (Level 3 
 
 
Influencing factors (PSFs) 
 
table with a flashlight to see 
1 SA) understanding (Level 2 SA) 
Unclear whether their mental 
SA) 
subsequent pressure readings/ 
how much fluid was missing. model was updated to include the tests. 
leak. 
~5.20pm e Drillers' cabin The volume in the riser is The crew appear confused The well site leader and tool The group of crew and visitors 
becomes crowded with people visibly dropping. suggesting that they were having pusher mentally simulate two may have distracted the crew's 
in anticipation of the 6pm shift The annular is tightened difficulty interpreting the options for the falling volume attention whilst interpreting the 
change and visiting BP and 
Transocean executives. 
with approximately 20 
e25bbls added to the riser. 
situation. 
A riser leak may have provided a 
(riser leak or a well leak) and 
decide to do another NPT. 
test readings and the riser leak. 
As the riser then remains static, it 
The OIM instructed the crew to The riser volume is then neat explanation for the previous They do not anticipate the effect supports the expectation that the 
tighten the annular seal around static. 
the DP with Wheeler (on shift 
TP) adding 20e25bbls  of  mud 
to the riser which then 
remained static. 
The readings are discussed and 
the well site leader interprets 
them as a riser leak and the tool 
pusher interpreted as a well 
leak problem. 
anomalous NPT readings and 
inability to bleed the pressure off 
the drill pipe. 
. 
of the spacer on the next test. well is fine. 
5.17pm e Mud offloading to the 
MN Damon Bankston ceased 
Drill crew are alerted that 
the unloading has been 
Update the current mental model Anticipate where the returning 
that space has been made for the mud will be routed to once the 
Not sharing information between 
the drill crew and the mud logger 
but it was unclear who was completed but the mud large amounts of returning mud current pit is full. which may have affected their 
notified of this. The mud logger logger was not notified. 
was not notified. 
from the displacement operation. ability to monitor the mud 
volumes. 
~5.30pm e Second NPT. Able to Able to bleed pressure down Understanding that the DPP was Do not anticipate that The procedure for conducting the 
bleed the drill pipe pressure to 0psi on the DP with bled down to 0psi and there was preparations are needed to NPT was general and did not 
down to 0psi with 15bbls bleed 15bbls were bled off. some bleed off. Without the calculate the acceptable amount include specific instructions on 
off but on closing it, it rose up to Once the DP was closed back expected amount of flow (3.5bbls) of bleed off during the test how to interpret the results, 
773psi. the pressure rose back up to it would be difficult to interpret (3.5bbls). making the interpretation more 
773psi. whether this was unacceptable It appears that the crew were confusing (work environment). 
and recognise the significance of 
the situation i.e. the test had 
failed. 
unable to mentally simulate what Expectations that the well was 
could be causing the readings and static in a closed system would 
the subsequent action of opening likely have influenced the mental 
Unclear how the crew interpreted the kill line would suggest so. 
the instantaneous pressure build 
up on closing the DP, possibly 
their mental model still attributed 
the pressure as being related to 
the riser leak. 
It is likely that the current mental 
model was of the well being a 
closed system, making 
interpretation (of an open system) 
more difficult. 
model. 
~5.50pm e The well site leader The DPP was bled down to Deciding to open the KLto “see Do not anticipate that Lack of experience with such a 
ordered the crew to bleed off 0psi but the KL continued to what happens” suggests that the preparations are needed to large volume of heavy spacer may 
the DPP by opening the KL flow with up to 15bbls of well site leader was unsure about calculate the acceptable amount have influenced their mental 
rather than the DP with the seawater until closed in. how to interpret the readings. of bleed off making interpretation model and mental simulations. 
explanation of “let's open the The DPP increased to Considering no expected bleed off more susceptible to error. Lack of training, procedures or 
kill line and see what happens”. 1400psi in 40 min. 
The pressure on the DP 
calculations were made and that 
the previous bleed off of 15bbls 
Did not appear to mentally 
simulate the consequences of up 
experience in interpreting results 
for both the drill pipe and kill line 
decreased to 0psi but the KL was deemed acceptable, this was to 15bbls of seawater coming out 
continued to flow and spurt up 
to 15bbls of seawater until it 
was closed (CCR, p.156). When 
it was closed the drill pipe 
pressure rose to 1400psi over 
the next 40 minutes 
not interpreted as a fail. 
Unclear if the current mental 
model was updated with 15bbls 
coming out of the KL, what was 
replacing it or if the spacer was 
still above the BOP. 
The following meeting suggests 
that the increasing pressure was 
recognized as concern but not 
interpreted as the well flowing. 
of the KL. 
6.35pm e The crew gathered to 1400psi on the DP which The tool pusher, backed up by the Anticipate that this situation may Expectation that NPT would pass 
discuss the anomalous readings has increased over a 40 min driller, interpret the 1400psi on become a problem for completing and that the cement job was 
with the two well site leaders, 
trainee well site leader, tool 
period with two previous 
NPTs over the last 90 min. 
the drill pipe as annular 
compressibility or the “bladder 
the operation and installing the 
cement plug. 
already a success would have 
influenced the acceptance of the 
pusher and driller present. The experienced and trusted effect”. Do not appear to have mentally bladder effect. 
tool pusher, backed up by 
the driller, suggests an 
explanation for the 
If this were the case the pressure simulated the effect of annular 
could be bled off, suggesting that compressibility on the current 
the crew did not fully understand mental model or what the 
The majority of the crew members 
were trade men, without 
considerable experience with 
anomalous build-up of DPP. the explanation or integrate it into expected readings would be. 
their mental model. 
That the well site leader (Vidrine) 
insists on another test on the kill 
abstract engineering or physics 
concepts (CCR, p.162) making 
them more susceptible to 
accepting this interpretation. The 
 
 
Table 3 (continued ) 
Event  e negative pressure test Information available (Level Crew interpretation/ 
 
 
Any predictions made? (Level 3 
 
 
Influencing factors (PSFs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~6.45pm e Prepared for the 
second attempt at NPT by 
opening the KL and bleeding 
down to 0psi. 
1 SA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Able to bleed KLP to 0psi 
with 15bbls of continual 
bleed off and DPP 1400psi. 
understanding (Level 2 SA) 
suggests that he did not fully 
accept the annular 
compressibility explanation. 
 
 
Without expected bleed off 
volumes and 15bbls previously 
being deemed acceptable, it is 
likely this was not interpreted as 
concerning. 
The 1400psi was now attributed 
to annular compressibility by at 
least the driller and tool pusher. 
However, the continual bleed off 
may have been interpreted as 
anomalous so the crew decided to 
check that it contained seawater 
by pumping a small volume into a 
mini trip tank. 
SA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do not appear to anticipate that 
preparatory calculations are 
needed for the expected amount 
of bleed off (3.5bbls), affecting 
subsequent interpretation. 
Mental simulations for what could 
be causing the continual bleed off 
may have prompted the checking 
of the kill line. 
 
tool pusher and driller were both 
considered experienced, trusted 
and well respected crew 
members, validating the shared 
information. 
Group think & Confirmation bias. 
Normalisation of relatively large 
bleed off volumes. 
7.15pm e After the KL was The kill line contained The kill line was confirmed to Anticipation would now focus on A considerable amount of time 
confirmed to contain seawater, seawater. contain seawater, removing any completing the abandonment spent discussing the problem 
it was re-opened. During that On opening it, only a small doubt that it contained something process rather than on alternative suggests that the crew were 
time the crew continued to amount flowed from the kill else. explanations for the readings. seeking to ensure that a consensus 
discuss the readings with the 
tool pusher and driller 
apparently continuing to 
line (~0.2bbl) and then 
stopped, remaining at 0psi 
for 30 min. 
With the annular compressibility 
to explain the 1400psi, the 
readings would have been 
was reached (sharing information 
and awareness and group think). 
The readings would have fit with 
explain it through the “bladder The 1400psi still present is 
effect” but all eventually agreed still attributed to annular 
interpreted as a pass for the 
negative pressure test. 
their expectation that the NPT 
would pass, influencing and 
on the explanation (CCR, 
p.158). 
8pm e The well site leaders 
compressibility. 
 
NPT is confirmed by the well Concluded that the well is static 
supporting their interpretation 
that the well was static. 
Preparation for the abandonment Further confirms expectations that 
conclude that the NPT is 
successful. 
site leaders to be successful. and the cement job is a success. of the well. the cement job is a success and 
that the NPT would pass. 
 
 
 
 
 At the end of preparations for the NPT, the driller, Revette's, mental model would have presumably calculated 
the mud and spacer to be appropriately positioned above the BOP. It is now recognised that this was very unlikely 
(Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p151; inaccurate mental model). Considering that the driller was unlikely to have had 
significant experience circulating such a large amount of spacer (see earlier), it is unclear whether he would have 
comprehended the considerable amount of time required to pump it into the correct position. Thus it is probable 
that the driller's mental model was inaccurate, likely affecting his subsequent interpretation of what was 
happening in the well in terms of the hydrostatic pressure in the upper parts of the well and BOP (level 2 SA), as well 
as anticipating the effect this may have on the subsequent negative pressure test. 
 
4.1.2. First negative pressure test 
 
Whilst preparing to conduct the first negative pressure test at 4.53pm, the Drill Pipe (DP) pressure was higher than 
expected. However, it does not appear that preparatory calculations for the acceptable pressure readings were 
required, thus there was no frame of reference for interpretation or recognition of the pressure reading as an anomaly 
(level 2 SA). Once opened, the DP and Kill Line (KL) pressure simultaneously increased and decreased respectively. 
Stored mental models and schemas held in long-term memory about the “U-tube effect” should have been activated 
with the knowledge that if the DP and KL contained the same fluid, the pressure should have matched (experience). 
This was recognised as an anomaly by Kaluza, the well site leader (Transocean Report, 2011, p.97; Chief Counsel's 
Report, 2011, p.153; level 1 & 2 SA) but it is likely that the drill crew's mental models were still inaccurate because 
of beliefs as to the position of the spacer. Thus, it is doubtful that they would have anticipated that this situation 
would reduce the reliability of the NPT or taken remedial action (level 3 SA and actions; Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, 
p.153). 
 
4.1.2.1. First attempt to bleed pressure down.  
On this first attempt to conduct the negative pressure test at 5pm, the crew were not able to bleed the drill pipe 
pressure off to the required level (see Fig. 2 for likely SA process for the first NPT). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Possible driller's SA for the first Negative Pressure Test at 5pm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The approximation of flow from the well suggests that the crew were not accurately monitoring this flow (Chief 
Counsel's Report, 2011, p.153). Nor does it appear that the crew anticipated that they would need to make any 
preparatory calculations for the acceptable amount of flow from the well (level 3 SA). Unable to bleed the pressure  
down, the crew closed the valve on the DP suggesting that they recognised the changes in pressure and amount of 
bleed off (level 1 SA) but did not interpret them as a failed NPT (level 2 SA). It is possible that the crew interpreted the 
flow as being the result of downward pressure from the spacer rather than as an indicator of pressure increasing in the 
well. The expectation of the NPT passing and the subsequent distraction of the riser leak would have likely affected 
their understanding of the situation (level 2 SA). 
At 5.10pm the crew recognised that the level of fluid in the riser was falling (level 1 SA) and their actions suggested 
that they were unable to effectively monitor the volume (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p.154). It is probable that 
they anticipated that another NPT would need to be conducted as a result of this falling fluid level (level 3 SA). The 
crew interpreted this as a riser leak which may have been affecting the previous pressure readings but it seems 
that this interpretation process was interrupted at 5.10pm by a personnel shift change and a group of visitors 
including BP and Transocean executives (distraction). The confusion at this time suggests that they were having 
difficulty interpreting the well state (level 2 SA & meta-cognition). Two conflicting explanations for the falling 
volume were reported: the riser leak or a well leak, and the crew decided to conduct another NPT although it 
appears that they did not anticipate the effect that these possibilities would have on the next test (level 3 SA). 
 
4.1.2.2. Second attempt to bleed pressure down. 
On the second set of bleed-offs, the crew were able to bleed the drill pipe pressure down appropriately but this rose 
back once the drill pipe was closed. Once more, no preparation for the acceptable amount of bleed off was calculated. 
That the crew started to immediately bleed off the pressure on the drill pipe (see below) suggests that they recognised 
the possible negative implications (level 2 SA) but likely had difficulty diagnosing the situation (level 2 SA). In addition, 
as mentioned previously, the procedure for conducting the NPT did not include specific instructions on what a failed 
test would look like (procedures/work environment). It is also possible that as the previous pressure on the drill pipe 
was attributed to the riser leak, this pressure increase would have been interpreted similarly. Consequently, it is 
unlikely that the crew would have correctly interpreted these readings as a failed NPT as a result of their 
misunderstanding of the well state, lack of acceptable flow calculations and insufficient procedures for interpreting the 
NPT. 
 
4.1.2.3. Third attempt to bleed pressure down.  
Kaluza, (the day shift BP well site leader) ordered the crew to bleed off the drill pipe pressure by opening the kill line 
rather than the drill pipe. Whilst this was outlined in the MMS approved procedure, the crew had not always followed 
these procedures so this order also suggested that he was unsure about how to interpret the situation (level 2 SA; 
meta-cognition) and that he and the crew were attempting to gather more information about the situation (level 1 
SA). It is also possible that the crew were aware that they were having difficulties but did not wish to appear 
incompetent, so took no action to remedy this situation (Hopkins, 2012). The drill line and kill line flows which 
resulted from this action were, in the absence of any calculations of the acceptable amount of flow, coupled with 
the results of the previous NPT, being deemed acceptable (experience; normalisation of readings; level 2 SA error). As 
the crew shut the kill line whilst it was still flowing, this suggested that they were aware that this was an 
anomalous indicator but did still not interpret this as the well flowing (level 2 SA). 
 
4.1.2.4. Bladder effect.  
Having recognised that the increasing drill pipe pressure was concerning (Level 1 SA), the crew met at 6.35pm to discuss 
the anomalous readings (sharing information & awareness; level 2 SA). Ezell, the senior tool pusher, said later that the 
crew lacked training, procedures and experience for interpreting NPT results for both the drill pipe and kill line (R. Ezell 
Trial Proceeding Testimony, p.1679; p.1704; p.1800). At this meeting, Anderson, the tool pusher, interpreted the 
readings as being caused by heavy mud in the riser which exerted pressure on the rubber annular preventer, 
subsequently transferring pressure to the well bore and drill pipe, thus explaining each previous build-up of pressure, 
referred to as the “bladder effect” or annular compressibility (level 2 SA). The tool pusher, Anderson, apparently backed 
up by the driller, Revette, told the well site leaders, Kaluza and Vidrine that “this happens all the time” and they all 
eventually agreed to this explanation (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p.157). 
 
 
 
 
 
 If annular compressibility was the cause (which it was not, according to industry experts), the drill pipe pressure could 
have been bled off but as the crew did not take this action to gather further information (level 1 SA) it suggests that the 
crew did not fully comprehend or mentally simulate how the “bladder effect” concept worked in their on-task mental 
model (level 2 SA). The drill crew may also not have had the relevant technical knowledge and expertise to critically 
evaluate the complex situation (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p.162) or the assertiveness to challenge the Transocean 
tool pusher's concept of annular compressibility, for fear of ‘losing face' (experience; social dynamics, Hopkins, 2012). In 
addition, the tool pusher and driller were both considered to be experienced, trusted and well respected crew 
members, their status validating the new information that they were telling the other drill crew members and the BP 
well site leaders (sharing information and awareness; R. Ezell trial proceeding transcript, p.1729; see Tharaldsen et al., 
2010 for a discussion of trust in drilling). The expectation that the cement job was already a success and that the second 
NPT would pass would still have been present (confirmation bias). It is likely that these factors may have made the crew 
more susceptible to accepting the erroneous explanation as illustrated in Fig. 3 below. 
 
 
4.1.3.Second negative pressure test 
 
The well site leader, Vidrine, insisted that a second NPT be conducted but monitoring the kill line instead of the drill 
pipe as was outlined in the MMS approved procedure. Considering that the crew had not always strictly followed these 
guidelines, it is possibly that this was out of his concern for the anomalous readings, suggesting that Vidrine did not 
fully accept the annular compressibility explanation (level 2 SA; Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, p.157). 
Without the previously calculated acceptable amount of volume and the knowledge of previous volume normalising 
the flow back volumes, the reading on the second NPT is likely to have been interpreted as acceptable (level 2 and 
3 SA). The continued flow from the kill line was probably recognised as anomalous and disconcerting. Consequently, 
it is likely that the crew mentally simulated what was causing the continued flow - this may have prompted the 
action of checking it contained seawater and not spacer (level 3 SA; action; Transocean Investigation Report, p.99). 
After it was confirmed to contain seawater, the kill line was opened to continue with the NPT (level 1 SA). Evidence 
suggests that checking its contents further plugged the kill line with spacer, stopping any further substantial flow, and 
erroneously giving appropriate readings. The result of this ‘successful’ NPT would likely have confirmed the expectation 
that it would pass and that annular compressibility was the cause of the previous anomalous pressure (level 2 and 
expectation). The continued discussion of “annular compressibility” suggests that group think could have been 
impacting on the crew's decision making, seeking to ensure that a consensus was reached (sharing information and 
awareness; group think, Hopkins, 2012). At 8pm the well site leaders Kaluza and Vidrine concluded that the second 
negative pressure test was successful (level 2 SA). 
The analysis stopped at this point. From 8pm onwards the driller, Revette, started to displace the heavier mud and 
spacer in the riser with sea water, re-routing the returning fluids to different pits to accommodate the large volume of 
fluid. This made it difficult to monitor the situation. There were a number of anomalous cues but the evidence 
suggests that these cues were missed. 
At 9.20pm Anderson, the on-shift tool pusher, told Ezell, the senior tool pusher, during a phone call that the NPT went 
well and that “Everything was fine” (R. Ezell trial proceeding transcript, p.1682; Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon 
Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, p.282). Between 9.40pm and 9.43pm mud started spewing out of the rotary 
table and the DPP increased from 338psi to 1200psi in 5 min. The AD, Curtis, calls the senior tool pusher, Ezell at 
9.45pm to say that “the well has blown out … and [Anderson] is shutting it in now” (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, 
p.181). At 9.49pm the gas from the blowout ignites and causes the first explosion. 
 
4.1.4. Summary 
The analysis of the Deepwater Horizon NPT with the DSA model emphasises the consequences of successively 
inaccurate SA on decision making and subsequent actions which, in this instance, resulted in the drill crew 
erroneously accepting that the well was stable despite signs to the contrary. The evidence in the reports suggests 
that the crew members recognised some of the available cues despite missing key information but did not appear 
to have understood their significance in the context of their mental model of the well state. Our analysis highlights 
how an inaccurate mental model and resulting expectations can impact on successive cycles of SA, influencing the 
interpretation of cues and how the situation is anticipated to develop. Distractions, inexperience and lack of 
procedures on how to interpret NPT readings, as well the possibility of fatigue and pressure to get the job done, 
would have likely influenced the crew's SA. 
 
 
 
4.2. Preliminary evaluation of the DSA model 
The evidence available from the investigation reports and court hearing testimony was examined for the drill crew's SA 
and then the extracted text items coded for the DSA components as a preliminary evaluation of the DSA model's 
suitability for the drilling domain. 
Table 4 shows that all the cognitive components of the DSA model were identified from the sources comprising 
attention, gathering information, cue recognition, understanding, mental models and anticipation. The frequency data 
show that perceptual (level 1 SA) and comprehension components (level 2 SA) occurred more frequently than 
anticipation (level 3 SA) with understanding being coded most often. However, there is notable variation between the 
sources, in both length and frequency in which SA was coded, possibly as a consequence of the focus of the source and 
the topics covered (e.g. court hearing testimony discussed specific aspects of the event whereas the Chief Counsel's 
Report gave a full chronology of the event). The variability limits the conclusions that can be made regarding the 
validity of the DSA model. 
Fig. 3. Possible drill crew's SA for the bladder effect. 
Table 5 shows the key influencing factors that were identified as potentially impacting on the drill crew's SA during 
the NPTs. Experience and work environment were coded most frequently, followed by expectations and distracters. 
Behaviours relating to sharing information and team work between the drill crew members were coded 62 times, most 
frequently in the R. Ezell BP trial proceeding testimony (14 times) and Chief Counsel's Report (2011; 8 times). Stress, 
workload, stored mental models and fatigue were coded infrequently, suggesting that they did not significantly impact on 
the  drill crew's SA according to the available evidence. However, the variation in the sources and focus of  
investigation teams may have down played the impact that they may have had. Overall, influencing factors for SA are 
not significantly considered in the investigation into the event. 
A drilling Subject Matter Expert (SME) verified the technical aspects, cognitive components and influencing factors 
that may have affected the drill crew's SA, supporting content validity of the analysis. The accident analysis provides a 
level of consistency with the previous interviews and observations (Roberts et al., 2015), supporting triangulation. 
5. Discussion
By applying a situational awareness model (DSA) developed specifically for the drilling domain to the Deepwater 
 Horizon disaster data, we have illustrated how the crew's SA played a pivotal role in the disaster. The crew's erroneous 
SA led to them falsely interpret the NPT as successful, which in turn affected their subsequent decision to continue with 
the temporary abandonment procedure that caused the blowout. This analysis highlights the value of the DSA model in 
examining and analysing cognitive failures in drilling incidents. It therefore, emphasises the value of utilizing human 
factors investigation tools in the process industry, for example, HFIT (Gordon et al., 2005) which has been applied in a 
large petroleum company for gas platforms, floating production, storage and take-off units and gas processing plants 
(Antonovsky et al., 2014). The analysis provides preliminary validation for the utility of the DSA model for the drilling 
domain and as a consequence tentatively supports Endsley's (1995) model of SA. It also endorses Reader and 
O'Connor's (2014) and Hopkins' (2012) identification of cognitive issues associated with the event, such as inaccurate 
mental models and expectations which drove confirmation bias. This study builds upon their work by using a fine- 
grained event analysis to explain why the drill crew erroneously accepted that the well was stable. There is also the 
possibility that the DSA model could be refined and tailored for similar monitoring positions in the process industries 
(see below for recommendations). 
Sneddon et al.'s (2006) analysis of SA in drilling accidents is supported by the results in Table 3 above. For example, 
they found level 1 SA errors associated with missing information (9.7%) and failures to monitor data (26.8%). We also 
identified errors of this nature during the Deepwater Horizon NPT. Sneddon et al.'s level 2 errors, relating to mental 
models (20%) were found to have a considerable impact on the interpretation of the NPT readings. Regarding the 
proportion of SA related problems identified during the Deepwater Horizon NPT, it appears that issues relating to 
missing information (level 1) and misunderstanding (level 2) occurred more frequently than anticipatory failures. Similar 
patterns of errors have also been found in other domains including aviation (Endsley and Jones, 1996) and maritime 
(Grech et al., 2002). The influencing factors identified in the NPT, such as workload, work environment, distracters and 
experience, also reflect Sneddon et al.'s interview study with drill crews on SA and the WSA rating tool (2006; 2013).
 
 
Table 4 
Number of times the SA components and influencing factors were coded for each source and in total. 
Source (no. Of pages SA was coded Level 1 SA Total Level 2 SA Total Level 3 SA Total no. of times 
in) 
Attention Gathering 
Information 
Cue 
Recognition 
level 1 
Understanding Mental 
models 
level 2 
Anticipation (total 
level 3) 
SA coded 
 
Chief Counsel's Report (14pgs) 10 10 6 26 18 14 32 13 71 
OLF Report (4pgs) 0 2 1 3 3 0 3 0 6 
Transocean Report (14pgs) 6 8 4 18 15 5 20 5 43 
Report to the President (8pgs) 6 1 1 8 12 2 14 2 24 
BP Report (11pgs) 2 2 2 6 11 6 17 6 29 
US Chemical Safety Board (12 pgs) 4 3 7 14 9 0 9 5 28 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group 6 7 8 21 12 4 16 8 45 
Report (7 pgs)          
R. Ezell BP Trial Testimony (80pgs) 5 6 3 14 12 2 14 5 33 
J. Keith USCG Testimony (38pgs) 4 5 3 12 6 0 6 0 18 
L. Lambert USCG Testimony (43pgs) 4 3 4 11 11 2 13 3 27 
L. Linder USCG Testimony (36pgs) 3 3 0 6 7 2 9 5 20 
Total (317pgs) 50 50 39 139 116 37 153 52 344 
 
Table 5 
Number of times the influencing factors were coded for each source and in total. 
Source Experience Expectations Stored mental 
Models 
 
 
 
Stress Distracters Work 
environment 
 
 
 
Workload Fatigue Total no. of times factors 
coded 
 
Chief Counsel's Report 6 6 2 0 2 8 1 0 25 
OLF Report 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Transocean Report 2 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 8 
Report to the President 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 0 7 
BP Report 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 
US Chemical Safety Board 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 8 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 8 
Report          
R. Ezell BP Trial Testimony 19 3 0 0 4 5 0 4 35 
J. Keith USCG Testimony 5 5 0 0 1 4 0 0 15 
L. Lambert USCG Testimony 4 5 0 0 1 3 0 0 13 
L. Linder USCG Testimony 5 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 
Total 49 29 5 0 11 39 1 4 138 
 
 
 
 
 
Fatigue, included in the WSA, was only mentioned briefly in the investigation reports, for instance, a number of the 
drill crew were close to the end of their rotas, making it more likely that they may have experienced fatigue (Burke et 
al., 2003). 
The IOGP (2012) report on cognitive issues in the oil and gas industry emphasised the importance of maintaining an 
accurate mental model and explained the impact that inaccurate SA can have on process safety. Our analysis  
specifically identifies the SA components that led the drill crew to erroneously believe that the NPT had passed, 
including missing information, not recognising the significance of the available indicators and specifically examining the 
inaccuracies in their likely on-task mental model (e.g. whether the spacer was above the BOP). In addition, a number of 
individual and task/environmental factors that may have impacted on the drill crew's SA were identified, including lack 
of experience, expectations that the NPT was to be successful, distraction, lack of clear procedures and fatigue. 
5.1. Limitations and future research 
Whilst applying the DSA framework to the Deepwater Horizon disaster provides insight into why the crew interpreted 
the NPT as successful despite evidence to the contrary, there are a number of limitations. Firstly, as the main figures 
involved were killed in the blowout, the majority of the sources are secondary and consequently there is a risk of bias, 
in part due to their origins from the legal proceedings. 
Where possible, firsthand accounts from transcripts were included to provide additional detail but these may also be 
distorted by biases, including hindsight bias (Dekker, 2007). It should also be acknowledged that the reports are a 
reflection of what was discussed during the investigation so it is possible that these may reflect the mental models and 
understanding of the lawyers and other individuals involved in the case, as much as those of the actual drill crew. 
Furthermore, limited attention was given to cognition and even less attention to influencing factors during the 
investigation. For example, none of the psychologists who had written expert witness reports were actually called to 
give evidence during the main trial. 
Secondly, the SA framework was developed for an individual driller's SA but the event includes the whole drill crew. 
Whilst the processes and influencing factors involved overlap between individual SA and team SA (e.g. Endsley and 
Jones, 2011), it may be fruitful to further develop the framework for team SA (e.g. distributed SA; Stanton et al., 2009; 
Stanton et al., 2015). In addition, considering the involvement of executive management during their visit in the 
event, it could also be interesting to examine their awareness of the situation and how that contributed to the outcome. 
The analysis preliminarily supports the suitability of the DSA model for the drilling domain using qualitative criteria 
(Miles et al., 2014). However, further evaluation will be required to test the validity of the components, as well as the 
processes i.e. that the components are present and in the order outlined in the model. Testing the prototype model 
against a body of accidents may also be valuable, such as using it to analyse a database of drilling incidents (e.g. Okoh 
and Haugen, 2013). We are now developing a performance measure of driller SA using an online simulated monitoring 
task which has the potential to quantitatively test the model's components and the relationships. A sequential analysis 
could then specifically test the predicted sequence of the cognitive components in the model, as has been recently 
reported for fire commanders SA and decision making (e.g. Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015). 
5.2. Recommendations 
Since Deepwater Horizon blowout, the oil and gas industry has recognised the value of human factors and of providing 
training in non-technical skills (NTS) such as SA (e.g. IOGP, 2012, 2014). Such efforts need to be encouraged, given that 
NTS have been found to play a critical role in maintaining safety and performance in other high risk occupations 
(Kanki et al., 2010; Yule et al., 2008; Fletcher et al., 2004; O'Connor et al., 2009). With the importance of 
monitoring in drilling, SA training of skills such as cue recognition, mental simulation, preparation for anticipated 
scenarios and coping with distracters may be worthwhile (e.g. Saus et al., 2006). The results of our analysis suggest a 
number of recommendations for maintaining accurate SA on the drill floor. Freer sharing of information between the 
client and operator would be valuable to reduce the risk  that  the drill  crew do not  have a  full understanding of the 
situation from the outset, providing a solid foundation for decision making. The continual gathering of information,  
particularly during complex or ambiguous situations, should be encouraged to ensure that crew are not basing their 
understanding on assumptions. Well control training already emphasises taking the action to gather information on  
 the situation by flow checking should the driller recognise a kick indicator (API, 2006; IADC, 2015). The power that 
expectations from hand-overs and meetings can have on subsequent SA should not be underestimated, with 
consideration to be given to how information is represented and framed during these periods (e.g. medical handovers, 
Manser et al., 2013; IOGP, 2014). Misinterpretation and anticipation failures were a source of possible error during the 
NPTs, suggesting that training and procedures should promote means of enhancing more accurate SA such as actively 
checking mental models (e.g. drawing a picture of the well), encouraging meta-awareness and seeking assistance when 
unclear (e.g. calling senior supervisors or the beach), as well as mental run-throughs for anticipated developments and 
required preparations. Considering work design recommendations for assisting SA would also be valuable such as 
ergonomic layout of information on display screens or software that assists cue recognition (e.g. Woodcock and Toy, 
2011). The sterile cockpit concept, in which non-essential activities are dropped during critical periods, may also be 
helpful for reducing distracters and workload on the drill floor (Wiener, 1985; Broom et al., 2011). 
Within the broader context of the process industries, it may be fruitful to consider specific SA training (e.g. nuclear 
power plant operators, Patrick et al., 2006; industrial operators, Nazir et al., 2015) or non-technical skills style training 
(e.g. Yim et al., 2013; O'Connor et al., 2008). There is the opportunity that the DSA model could be adapted for use in 
similar monitoring and intervention positions that require high levels of SA where operators continually attend to 
displays and the environment to build up an understanding of the situation and take decisions based on anticipated 
outcomes. For example, it could be tailored for other offshore positions (e.g. mud loggers or crane operators), nuclear 
power plant operators or petrochemical positions (e.g. refinery control panel operators). Consequently, the 
recommendations based on the Deepwater Horizon analysis may also be generalized for similar process industry 
positions, such as supporting the gathering and sharing of information between team members, actively checking 
mental models (e.g. confirming locations of volatile fluids or valve positions in a petrochemical plant) and encouraging 
seeking assistance when unsure (e.g. calling a supervisor when unsure about readings from a treatment unit in a 
refinery). Considering the impact of expectations from handovers on SA would also be valu- able (e.g. Carvalho et al., 
2012). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This analysis of the situation awareness aspects of the Deep water Horizon NPTs provides (1) detailed insight into why 
the crew erroneously accepted that the NPT was successful and believed that the well was stable, influencing their 
decision to continue with the temporary abandonment procedure that culminated in the blowout. It also provides (2) 
preliminary validation for the utility of the prototype DSA model (Roberts et al., 2015) for the drilling domain. The 
analysis highlights how inaccuracies in SA, such as faulty mental models, can percolate through subsequent SA cycles, 
having considerable consequences for process safety. The crew appear to have misunderstood the situation with an 
expectation that the NPT would pass but lacking experience and procedures on how to interpret the anomalous NPT 
readings. 
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Appendix A. Abbreviations and glossary 
 
~ - Approximately. 
Bbls - Barrels is the volume used to measure drilling fluids and hydrocarbons. 
Bladder Effect - Heavy mud in the riser exerted pressure on the rubber annular preventer in the BOP, 
subsequently transferring pressure to the well bore and drill pipe, thus explaining each previous build-up of 
pressure. No industry experts have heard of or supported this explanation. 
BOP - Blow-Out Preventer is a set of valves located at the top of the well that may be remotely closed to 
control formation fluids in the well. It can close around the drill string/pipe in the well bore to create a seal. 
Boost Line - An auxiliary line which provides supplementary fluid supply from the surface and injects it into the 
riser to assist in the circulation of drill cuttings up the riser, when required. 
Casing - A large diameter pipe lowered into an open well and cemented into place to stabilize the well and 
separate the formation from the well bore. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cement - A material that is pumped into place to permanently seal annular spaces between casing and 
borehole walls. Various additives are used to control the density, setting time, strength and flow properties 
of the cement. 
Choke line - A high pressure pipe coming from the BOP stack to the choke manifold on the rig that can be used 
to circulate drilling 
fluids during well control operations. 
CCR - Chief Counsel's Report (2011) 
DP - Drill Pipe is tubular steel conduit that connects the rig surface equipment with the bottom hole 
assembly and drill bit, that can be used to pump drilling fluid to and control the bottom hole assembly and 
drill bit. Multiple pieces can be joined together using threaded ends, called tool joints, to produce long drill 
strings. 
DPP - Drill Pipe Pressure. 
DSA - Driller Situation Awareness. 
Float - A check valve that can be used to control the flow direction and/or position of drilling fluid or cement. 
Kick - An influx of fluids into the well from the formation during drilling operations. 
KL - Kill Line is a high pressure pipe coming from the BOP stack to the rig pumps that can be used to circulate 
drilling fluids during well control operations. It acts as a redundancy to the choke line. 
KLP - Kill Line Pressure. 
LCM - Lost Circulation Material is designed for plugging losses to the formation. 
Mud - A generic term for drilling fluids including water, oil and synthetic based fluids. 
NPT - Negative Pressure Test is used to test the integrity of the bottom hole cement job. Effectively, the 
downward hydrostatic pressure is removed allowing any formation pressure, should the cement job be 
ineffective, to enter the well bore manifesting itself  as a pressure build up and flow from the well. 
NTS - Non-Technical Skills are cognitive and social skills including leadership, communication, decision 
making, situation awareness and team work, as well as skills for coping with stress and fatigue. 
OIM - Offshore Installation Manager. 
PPG - Pounds per gallon is used to indicate the density of a drilling fluid. 
Riser - A large diameter pipe used to connect sub-sea BOP stacks to floating rigs, transporting drilling 
fluids back to the rig surface. 
Rotary Table - A revolving section of the drill floor that provides power to turn the drill string. 
SA - Situation Awareness. 
Spacer - Acts as a separating medium between drilling fluid and subsequent cement or sea water and can 
be used to disperse the drilling fluid from the well before starting a cement job. 
Temporary Abandonment Procedure - A procedure used on a drilling rig to temporarily plug a well so 
that a production rig can complete it at a later date into a production well. 
Tensioner - A device used to hold the riser in place between differential movements between the sea 
bed and floating. 
Trip Tank - A mental tank with a small capacity that is used to monitor the well. 
U-tube - This occurs when both legs of the U-tube - the drill pipe and the annulus up to the kill line - are
opened and will
balance out depending on the equal fluids which they contain.
WSA - Work Situation Awareness.
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